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Abstract
Despite strong professional practice norms experimental economists are increasingly
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1 Introduction
Economics has developed strong experimental design and practice norms within the
profession (de Quidt et al., 2019). However the autonomy of experimental economists in
designing and conducting their studies is eroding. For better or worse, experimentalists
are having to pay increasing attention to the changing perceptions of other stakeholders,
chiefly public policymakers, universities and experimental participants. In most places
experimental research is now subject to approval from ethics review boards (ERBs) that
uphold regulatory standards designed to protect research participants from ethical risks.
For experimental economists this presents significant issues. ERBs represent the formal
institutions introduced with the intention to supersede previous informal professional norms.
Their rules are bulky and apply indiscriminately, i.e. to human participants research beyond
both economics and experiments. In particular, policymakers and ERBs are frequently
ignorant of experimental economics practice and the scientific reasons behind it. ERBs
have also been accused of overreach and pursuit of bureaucratic interest (e.g. Haggerty,
2004; Van den Hoonaard, 2011). As result ERB processes impose significant costs on
experimental economists (Page and Page, 2017).
ERBs are routinely concerned with a broad range of potential risks associated with human
participant research, many of which typically do not concern experimental economists (see
Greiner and Stephanides, 2019). Examples include recruitment of inherently vulnerable par-
ticipants, invasive methods and deception. However one that does apply is the recruitment
of students as participants (e.g. Dalziel, 1996; Clark and McCann, 2005). This is common
in all social sciences including economics (de Quidt et al., 2019) 1 where students have
traditionally been recruited for the convenience (i.e. relatively low opportunity cost) of
both researcher and student participant (Henrich et al., 2010, p. 108) and “allowed a boom
in human experimentation” (Exadaktylos et al., 2013, p. 4). This is no longer ethically
uncontroversial. For example, Australia’s National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human
Research (2018) states that students “are vulnerable to being overresearched because
of the relative ease of access to them as research populations.” In the U.S., proposed
changes to the federal ‘Common Rule’ governing human participant research include a
new provision to review proposed studies which may “have a detrimental effect on student
achievement” (U.S. Government, 2015).
The increasing perception of the vulnerability of student participants by ERBs challenges
experimental economists for whom the ability to recruit them affects research output and
career progression. On the other hand, the potential ethical risks to participants should be
taken seriously by all researchers, and especially when a duty of care exists beyond their
research projects (i.e. as teachers). An appropriate response to the concern of using student
participants in economic research must start with a systematic and critical discussion of
the potential issues that concern policymakers, their validity in theory and practice, and
the potential measures that can be put in place to mitigate them. On a pragmatic level,
ERB processes increasingly pose challenges to project timelines and scientific integrity that
1 These authors found that around 80% of experiments published in top economics journals
between 2012 and 2017 were laboratory studies, of which “most [...] draw participants from the
overall student body” (p. 390).
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need to be managed. A systematic understanding of ethical issues associated with the use
of student participants is therefore important in practice as well as in principle.
This paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of ethical issues in student participation
in economic research. We examine the ethical risks that policy has identified in student
experimentation and how can they be mitigated. We address three specific questions: (1)
What are these potential ethical issues of student participation (experimentation) in theory?
(2) What are the potential countermeasures that economists can (and often do) deploy
in the research design and protocols to mitigate these issues? (3) Are these successful in
reducing risks of harm in the eyes of potential student participants? 2 The overall purpose
of this paper is to inform economists dealing with ERBs through a critical discussion of
the ethical issues associated with using student participants along with empirical evidence
regarding efficacious countermeasures.
In response to (1), we identify and examine five key types of ethical issue in student
participation in economic research (section 2). Our approach is qualitative: We consulted
a range of national, international as well as university ethical guidelines regarding human
participant research that raise concerns in varying detail. 3 We also used our collective
experimental research and institutional experience to furnish additional issues that are
expressed mainly between the lines of official documents and processes. In response to
(2), we then identify various countermeasures economists may (and often do) take to
alleviate these ethical issues. Finally, in response to (3), we present experimental evidence
of the efficacy of the countermeasures in reducing risks as judged by students. Gauging the
perceptions of actual and potential participants is a valid approach because of the subjective
nature of ethics concerns (e.g. Milgram, 1964). The empirical study was conducted online
with U.S. university students who were asked to assess a standard lab experiment presented
in different versions in order to test the efficacy of our countermeasures. The design and
results are presented in section 3. We discuss our findings in section 4 and offer concluding
remarks in section 5.
2 Ethical Issues in Student Participation in Research
What are the potential risks of negative effects of economic research conducted with
student participants? In this section we outline five potential issues identified through our
qualitative analysis of ERB guidelines (see also Greiner and Stephanides, 2019). For each
we state the case for an ethical concern before discussing it critically and finally outlining
potential design countermeasures. Table 1 provides an overview of these two dimensions
of our analysis.
2 Our focus throughout is not on the important scientific issues surrounding student participants
such as external validity that are discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g. Harrison and List, 2004;
Levitt and List, 2007; Henrich et al., 2010). Scientific issues are mentioned only where they
relate to ethics concerns.
3 While prevailing national guidelines govern practice in American (National Commission 1978)
and Australian experimental economics centres, no central guideline seems to govern European
ones. We inferred their practice from their individual institutional websites.
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Ethical Risks
Countermeasures 2.1 Dependent
Relationships
2.2 Learning
Outcomes
2.3 Customer
Relations
2.4 Educational
Equity
2.5 Negative
Effects
Debriefing
Informed Consent
Educational Relevance
Opt-In
Non-Teacher Researchers
Recruitment Database
Private Payment
Non-Class Time
Non-Differential Rewards
Table 1
The nine countermeasures by the ethical risks they address. Matches denoted by ticks.
2.1 Dependent Relationships
The Issue A fundamental ethical principle of human participant research generally is
consent, where participants have freely volunteered to participate (e.g. Commonwealth of
Australia, 2018). When students are recruited as participants, genuine consent may be
muddied by their power dependency relationships with researcher-teachers inviting them
to participate. A power relationship between academic and student may create perceived
pressure to participate. For instance a student who is invited by their teacher to participate
in a research project may consent only to avert informal sanctions (in terms of poor grades
or references) that they fear may result. According to the Australian National Statement,
pre-existing relationships between participants and researchers [...] may compromise the
voluntary character of participants’ decisions, as they typically involve unequal status,
where one party has or has had a position of influence or authority over the other.
Similarly, according to an international list of guidelines on human participant research
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010), students are identified as a
vulnerable group because they may feel coerced to participate in research by their teachers.
In psychology, where participation is often expected as part of course credit, the resulting
potential for dependent relationship issues has been recognised. The American Psychological
Association’s (APA) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (2010) require
researchers to take steps “to protect the prospective participants from adverse consequences
of declining or withdrawing from participation” including “the choice of equitable alternative
activities” where the research is part of a course. Other authors have gone further and
questioned the ethical merit of for-credit participation altogether (e.g. Baumrind, 1964, p.
421).
Discussion Dependent relationships may seem more harmless from the perspective of
teacher-researchers who after all are the more powerful party. However, they need to be
taken seriously not least due to the subjective nature of the concerns involved. When
researchers also teach classes, especially large undergraduate ones, power dependency
relationships with some research participants are statistically likely. Experimental economists
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indirectly acknowledge that power relationships can affect a participant in their recognition
of demand effects that may result when a desire to accommodate the experimenter
motivates particular responses in the experiment (e.g. Zizzo, 2008; de Quidt et al., 2019).
Where dependent relationships exist prior to the research, the decision to participate may
be similarly influenced.
On the other hand it seems that the magnitude of the resulting ethical issue depends
much on a range of specific circumstances. Chief among these is whether the research
is indeed part of a particular course or instead is organised by the teacher purely for her
own research independent of any course (Diamond and Reidpath, 1992). Moreover, if the
class is large then students may perceive a greater degree of anonymity. The perception of
detrimental non-participation may also decrease in the age and experience of the students
involved. In addition to the ethical considerations, reducing the perception of dependency
may be prudent scientifically to the extent that they give rise to demand effects.
Countermeasures A number of potential protocol measures can mitigate dependent
relationship effects. One is disconnecting research participation from course teaching or
assessment. Further, seeking the views of student representatives on student involvement
in research can inform ethical recruitment and participation of students in research (e.g.
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, 2002). Another is to ensure
that the interaction between researcher-teachers and participants is double blind. Teacher-
researchers may use research assistants to recruit for and conduct sessions to break
mutual identification. Finally, to mitigate students’ perception of risk from choosing
not to participate in a teacher’s research, participation can be based on opt-in rather
than opt-out (e.g. Commonwealth of Australia, 2018), which is a requirement in some
national codes. It means that a person is by default not a participant but needs to actively
volunteer, for example by responding to the invitation. In our study we focus on the latter
two countermeasures, i.e. the extent to which using non-teacher researchers and opt-in
participation can alleviate concerns from dependent relationships.
2.2 Learning Outcomes
The Issue A second concern with student participation in research is potential harm to
their learning outcomes. When research is conducted during scheduled classroom time, it
“might draw sufficient time and attention away from the delivery of the regular educational
curriculum [to] have a detrimental effect on student achievement” (U.S. Government,
2015, p. 27). This concern mostly relates to research with new teaching methods designed
to improve pedagogy. Such research often require repeated unsuccessful trials and can
negatively impact learning outcomes for the students involved.
Discussion In-class experiments are more common among psychologists including ones
performed for course credit. In economics, less than 5% of experiments are conducted in
class (de Quidt et al., 2019). The reasons can also be educational, when future generations
of researchers are being trained. The concern over learning outcomes therefore depends
much on the purpose of the experiment. In general, economic experimentation is not
conducted to identify effective classroom innovations. Further, when economists do conduct
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classroom (rather than research) experiments the typical objective is to improve the learning
experience of current (rather than future) students (e.g. Bergstrom and Miller, 1998; Holt,
2007). There is evidence in favour of learning opportunities that these kinds of experiments
afford. Course-relevant research can be used as meaningful in-class activities (Frank, 1997;
Ball et al., 2006) supporting “experiential learning” (Castilla, 2014) and improving test
scores (Dickie, 2006). Researchers can enhance the educational relevance of their studies as
teachers through the principle of research-led teaching. Conversely they can find inspiration
for their research from teaching, especially when there are student cohorts with significant
work experience, such as MBAs, who highlight policy and practice issues that experiments
can usefully address.
However, it is clearly neither feasible nor desirable to always and fully restrict research to
areas of educational relevance to students. Research may be exploratory or ahead of received
knowledge. Moreover, syllabi are increasingly standardised and changes to them are subject
to demanding processes. At any rate educational relevance is hard to measure accurately
especially to the extent that general knowledge or intellectual development are integral
parts of a university student’s education. Pure research conducted outside the context
of a particular course can also benefit student learning. Under the right circumstances
participation promotes more general intellectual development by demonstrating the process
of research, introducing topical research issues and generally whetting students’ appetites
for the pursuit of knowledge. The large-scale U.S. survey by Russell et al. (2007) showed
that undergraduates’ research opportunities promote their interest in research and can
nudge them towards research degrees. Students may also learn about their own behavioural
proclivities (Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2015). This is true particularly where there are post-
research debriefings, as required by the American Psychological Association (2010, p. 11)
ethical guidelines.
Countermeasures Instead of a single countermeasure, learning outcomes as a general
objective can be addressed by several design and protocol features. Targeting students
from research-relevant study programmes is one way. In our own study in this paper we
consider the effects of four countermeasures when there is a risk to learning outcomes
from participating in economic research. The first is to conduct research exclusively outside
scheduled classes as separate activities. A second measure is to create educational relevance,
i.e. a positive link between research and student learning outcomes. Economic research
is almost always relevant to what some students are supposed to learn. A link arises if
such students were targeted or self select for participation. Our third countermeasure is
informed consent. Self-selection is based on informing potential participants (in general
terms) about the objectives and issues of the research so they may assess a link to their
learning outcomes. A fourth countermeasure is to conduct debriefings (Baumrind, 1964)
that inform participants about the issues behind the research and likely findings. Where
applicable, researchers might highlight links to syllabus content and learning outcomes.
That said, debriefings harbour the potential for revealing research objectives to participants
in future sessions in the case of experiments. In the case of experiments an alternative
to verbal debriefings at the end of each session would be to deliver debriefings after the
conclusion of the final session via social and electronic media.
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2.3 Customer Relations
The Issue A third concern, especially relevant for institutions with significant or exclu-
sively private funding, is customer relations management. Our own experience at different
institutions suggests that universities are concerned with avoiding annoyance when fee-
paying students are approached excessively or lose class time to research projects of little
educational value to them. A related symptom of this concern is the reluctance of many
institutions to grant their own researchers unfettered access to student email lists. The
stated rationale is often anecdotal evidence that students complain about excessive emails
from the university. This mirrors a recent trend against over-surveying in customer relations
marketing (e.g. Grimes, 2012; Glazer, 2015). This kind of concern is associated with a
much-debated view of college students as customers that is resisted by many academics
(e.g. Eagle and Brennan, 2007).
Discussion The counterarguments to this view come from the ways in which university
students differ from customers in purely commercial relationships. Students may see
themselves as members of a scholarly community and have pro-social motives to contribute
(Krause, 2005). Students may recognise costs and benefits to community membership,
which, in cases such as research participation, have a public good character as they generate
non-excludable benefits such as knowledge creation and university reputation. Participation
or at least receiving solicitations to participate should therefore be an expected part of
being a student.
There are also private benefits from participation. Even as customers, students stand to
benefit from the additional opportunity for learning (as mentioned) but also for financial
rewards to contribute to the rising costs of higher education. If researchers calibrate
earnings to match students’ typical opportunity cost (e.g. Friedman and Sunder, 1994),
then participation can provide a relatively attractive and convenient alternative to earning
income.
Countermeasures To the extent that students see themselves as consumers of education,
the previous four countermeasures to learning outcome risks may reduce customer relations
concerns also. In addition, in our study we examine to what extent the use of recruitment
databases such as ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) can alleviate annoyance from unsolicited email
invitations by sending participation invitations only to subscribed members. Furthermore,
opt-in can avoid the impression that education providers are unilaterally redefining the
transaction with their student customers to include research participation by default.
2.4 Educational Equity
The Issue The presence of incentive compatibility in economic experiments means
student participants often receive differential rewards for the same commitment in terms
of time and effort. ERBs are often unaccustomed to performance-related payments for
student participants, to the reasons behind these and tend to query this feature. The
reason is that educational equity or fairness is a fundamental principle of education (Field
et al., 2007). Differential rewards, when common knowledge, may be interpreted by ERBs
as jarring with student participants’ or institutions’ perceptions of fair treatment within
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the educational environment.
Discussion ERBs are often poorly informed about what incentive compatibility means
for participants in practice and why economists insist on it. Often clarification can help. For
example, one may need to highlight the fact that differential rewards are neither random nor
completely out of the control of participants. While rewards may be subject to chance or
the decisions of other participants they reflect the decisions participants make under these
conditions. At other times rewards depend on effort levels that are selected by participants
with commensurate financial consequences (for an overview see Gill and Prowse, 2011).
Despite continuing methodological debate, incentive compatibility remains one of the two
cornerstones of experimental economics that differentiates the field from experimental
psychology (e.g. Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; Croson, 2005). The importance economists
attach to it is demonstrated by the associated costs. Incentive compatibility not only raises
ERB concerns but entails logistical effort of determining and delivering differential rather
than flat rewards. If performance-related earnings from interactive tasks are to be delivered
instantly, co-players must make decisions at the same time (Arechar et al., 2018). Using
the strategy method of eliciting responses to all potential circumstances eliminates this
need but can create bias (Chuah et al., 2013).
There are a number of counterarguments to the resulting concerns over fairness. The first
relates to the meaning of fairness. Deutsch (1975) differentiates between two meanings,
fairness as equality (same consequences irrespective of performance) and as equity (same
translation of performance into consequences). While incentive compatibility may violate
equality as same outcomes, it is consistent with the principle of equity. In education the idea
of possibly unequal outcomes is accepted when academic performance differs (‘fair isn’t
equal’) and therefore the focus is on ensuring equal process (Welch, 2000). Indeed one of
the functions of the education system is to provide labour market signals that differentiate
students on the basis of performance. A related second point is that performance-related
pay more generally reflects real-life interactions that university is meant to prepare students
for.
Countermeasures Notwithstanding whether economists recognise the concern regarding
the fairness of compatible incentives, protocol countermeasures can help alleviate it. One is
informed consent, i.e. that participants have not only freely volunteered but done so based
on their unimpaired understanding of all information relevant to the associated potential
risks and benefits of participation (e.g. Commonwealth of Australia, 2018). Informed
consent is part of the APA code and a legal requirement in many jurisdictions such as
Australia. For example, an informed consent process that advertises performance-related
pay in an experiment would allow participation decisions to be informed accordingly.
Moreover, separating experimental participation or performance from course credit or even
grades consigns any perceived unfairness to a more peripheral aspect of the educational
experience. In addition, it has been shown in general educational settings that explaining the
rationale behind differential rewards can address fairness concerns of students (e.g. Welch,
2000). A similar approach may work to make incentive compatibility more palatable among
those student participants who harbour reservations. This can be done by experimental
debriefings, for example. In addition, equality can be increased through a show-up fee that
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ensures everyone leaves with something.
We examine four of these countermeasures in the present study. The first two are informed
consent and debriefings. We also examine non-differential or flat payment schemes that
eliminate perceived unfairness from incentive compatibility. This allows us to gauge to what
extent differential payments are perceived as ethically problematic by students. Fourth,
we examine whether ensuring privacy of earnings and their delivery can mitigate risks by
eliminating the possibility of comparison among participants.
2.5 Negative Effects
The Issue A final ethical concern is that the activities participants perform or are
subjected to in an experiment can cause harm to themselves and/or other participants.
Even in studies without physical intervention, participation may have adverse psychological
effects. Controversial examples from the history of psychology are Milgram’s obedience
study (Baumrind, 1964; Milgram, 1964; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2015), Wendell Johnson’s
stuttering experiment (Reynolds, 2003) and the Stanford prison experiment (Zimbardo,
1973).
While standard economic experiments involve no physical interventions nor deception there
is still scope for negative effects. For example, a participant’s own decisions in social
dilemma situations or experiments with the ‘dark side’ of human motivations (e.g. Abbink
and Herrmann, 2011) may result in an unexpected threat to self image. Some participants
may also be disappointed with their earnings in absolute terms or relative to others. In
hindsight participants may worry that incentive compatible risk tasks they were asked to
perform contravene religious proscriptions of gambling, or take risks they otherwise would
not accept (Greiner and Stephanides, 2019). Some participants may resent the decisions
their co-participants make in strategic situations or fear recrimination based on their own
strategic decisions.
Discussion Participants may rightfully expect that researchers are concerned with their
welfare and avoid subjecting them to potential harm (Baumrind, 1964; American Psy-
chological Association, 2010). However, there are cases where some degree of perceived
harm may need to be accepted. One reason is a significant element of subjectivity in the
perception of harm, as with the previous issues of dependent relationships and fairness. In
practice it is impossible to conduct research to satisfy the most acute harm perceptions.
More fundamentally, there is often a trade-off between scientific and ethical objectives. The
reason is a limit to how much participants can be told about an experiment without biasing
responses through divulging the exact research question (List, 2008; Ifcher and Zarghamee,
2015). For example, Milgram’s experiment would not have been successful had he exercised
complete candour. In such cases individual adverse effects need to be weighed against
the scientific benefit of the experiment (Baumrind, 1964, 1971; American Psychological
Association, 2010). The research may then be justified on the grounds that the scientific
value outweighs inevitable negative effects. For many, the classic studies by Milgram and
Zimbardo fall into this category. On the other hand this trade-off applies to psychology more
than to experimental economics, where strict non-deception of participants is practiced
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(see Bonetti, 1998). Under non-deception, researchers cannot protect the scientific integrity
of an experiment by keeping relevant details from participants beforehand.
Countermeasures Economists can adopt countermeasures to minimise the potential
for harm from activities participants perform in experiments. As previously mentioned,
appropriate informed consent procedures allow participants to avoid experiments they
deem personally risky. As another measure, debriefings not only outlining the research
issues but also describing the typical responses of participants can help alleviate self
image threats (Milgram, 1964). Participants may find solace in learning their behaviour
in an experiment corresponds to what many others do. Another measure is ensuring
the anonymity and privacy of decisions and earnings. Others’ mere awareness of one’s
choices can entail a psychic cost when disapproval is feared (Chuah et al., 2016). For
example, if a participant keeps the entire stake in a dictator game, then the public payment
delivery can cause discomfort from others’ gaze, to use Sartre’s (1956) term. This cost
is clearly greater when a lack of anonymity allows sanctions by affected others after the
experiment. Finally, to the extent that perceived unfairness of unequal rewards causes
negative effects, a non-differential payment scheme can alleviate such concerns. These
four previously-mentioned countermeasures (debriefing, informed consent, non-differential
rewards and private payment) are tested in the present study.
3 Study
We have seen that economic experiments with students harbour certain ethical risks that
could in principle be addressed with the different countermeasures we identified (table
1). In this section we report an empirical study designed to examine the effectiveness of
these measures in addressing ethical risks by reducing student participants’ perceptions
of harm from participation in economic experiments. Our approach was to examine the
extent to which different versions of a hypothetical study conform with or violate relevant
ethical norms of the population affected, i.e. potential student participants. We use the
incentive-compatible norm elicitation method proposed by Krupka and Weber (2013).
These authors’ mechanism measures ‘social appropriateness’ of certain actions using a pure
coordination game. In particular, participants make judgements along a four-point scale
of appropriateness without a neutral response and are rewarded to match the response
of others. Responses elicited in this way reflect what is “collectively perceived as socially
appropriate or inappropriate” (Krupka and Weber, 2013, p. 502). 4 We use the same
method to elicit participants’ collective perceptions of the appropriateness (in terms of risk
of harm) of a hypothetical research study based on several modular features that we vary
systematically. We examine the effect of each of these features on the perception of harm
from participation.
4 For empirical examinations of this mechanism see Erkut et al. (2015), whose study supports
its validity, and Vesely` (2015), who finds its incentive element does not affect responses.
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3.1 Design and Implementation
The study was conducted via online questionnaire 5 in December 2018 with 294 current
university students residing in the United States, recruited and paid via Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT). Their ages ranged between 18 and 61 (mean: 22.2) and 48% identified as
female. 85% percent were U.S. citizens. Participants completed the study in approximately
seven minutes. A total of 124 participants (42%) successfully matched the responses of
others and were rewarded with a bonus payment. To avoid any potential university specific
selection bias, AMT student participants from different universities were sampled.
The hypothetical study consisted of a fixed set of features that remained constant and was
shown to every participant (see top panel, table 2). In addition there were nine individual
features, each of which had a negative (greater risk of harm) and a positive (less risk
of harm) version (see table 2). These features and their versions were chosen to elicit
collective perceptions regarding the theoretical ethical risks discussed previously (in the
guise of the negative versions) and the efficacy of the potential countermeasures (as the
positive versions) we identified in response. In particular we presented participants with
general instructions adapted from Krupka and Weber (2013): 6
Your task in this survey is to assess the effects that participation in a hypothetical paid
research study at your university or college would have on participants. We will provide you
with different features of this paid research study and ask you to rate the potential for harm,
discomfort, inconvenience or other negative consequences.
At the end of this survey, we will randomly choose one of the additional features. For this
chosen feature, we will determine which rating was selected by the most respondents in this
survey, i.e. the most popular rating out of the four on the scale. If you gave the same rating
as the most popular rating, then you will receive a bonus of $1. This bonus will be paid to
you in addition to your participation fee.
After the presentation of the fixed feature set by itself participants were shown, on
subsequent separate screens and in random order, the fixed feature set plus either a positive
or a negative version of each of the nine additional features. Subsequently, they were asked
about their perception of harm from the standard set plus the additional feature described.
For each of these nine we asked:
Please rate a study as described above with this additional feature in terms of its potential for
harm, discomfort, inconvenience or other negative consequences: (Remember: if this feature is
chosen, you will receive the bonus if your rating is the same as the most popular rating).
For brevity we refer to these aspects collectively as ‘harm’ in the following. Participants
responded along a four-point rating scale of high potential (coded as 1), some potential
(2), not much potential (3) no potential (4).
The two versions of each of the features constituted our treatments. We implemented a
between-participant design to test the effects of these features on participants’ assessment
of risk of harm. Assignment of participants to these versions was balanced in that each
5 For a discussion of online experiments see Arechar et al. (2018).
6 The full experimental materials are available from the online supplementary documents or
from the corresponding author.
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Fixed Features
Imagine you have been invited to participate in a paid study to be conducted at your university/college by researchers from that
institution. You are told that participation in the study is completely voluntary, i.e. it is entirely up to you whether you participate
or not without any negative consequences if you do not. If you were to take part this study you would be asked to make a series
of decisions in private, either by filling in a paper form or an electronic form using a computer. You may also be asked to answer
standard demographic questions about yourself (such as your gender, age etc) and/or your attitudes, opinions and values. All
responses you make will be completely anonymous, i.e. your data will be identified only by a random code and can never be traced
back to your person.
Individual Features
Positive Version Negative Version
Debriefing (DB)
After the study is completed you will be given information about
what the purpose of the study was and what the researchers found
out.
After the study is completed you will not be given information
about what the purpose of the study was and what the researchers
found out.
Informed Consent (IC)
Before the study you will be given a document which explains
everything about the study that is relevant to your decision to
participate. If you do decide to participate you will be asked to
sign a document that indicates you consent to take part.
Before the study you will be told very little about what participa-
tion entails and what you will be asked to do. There will be no
form for you to sign to indicate your consent to take part.
Educational Relevance (ER)
By taking part in the study you can learn things that are relevant
to what you are learning as part of your academic degree or
program.
By taking part in the study you cannot learn things that are
relevant to what you are learning as part of your academic degree
or program.
Opt-In (OA)
In order to participate in the study you have to actively opt in.
This means that the default is that you do not take part and you
have to indicate if you do want to take part.
In order not to participate in the study you have to actively opt
out. This means that the default is that you take part and you
have to indicate if you do not want to take part.
Non-Teacher Researcher (TR)
The researcher is not someone who teaches you, grades your work,
will write you an academic reference or someone you depend on
as an academic in other ways.
The researcher is someone who teaches you, grades your work,
will write you an academic reference or someone you depend on
as an academic in other ways.
Recruitment Database (RD)
The invitation to participate was emailed to you from a mailing
list that you actively signed up to. This mailing list is maintained
by researchers at your university/college and advertises such paid
scientific studies.
The invitation to participate was an unsolicited email from the
researchers that was addressed to you and other students at your
university/college.
Private Payment (PP)
The money you receive will be paid out to you in private so
that other participants do not see how much you received. For
example, you are given the money in another room away from
other participants after the study is over.
The money you receive will be paid out to you in public so that
other participants may see how much you received. For example,
after the study is over, you are given the money in the same room
where other participants are present.
Non-Class Time (CT)
The study will not take place during class time, i.e. instead of or
during a scheduled lecture, seminar, tutorial or other classroom
activity with a teacher.
The study will take place during class time, i.e. instead of or
during a scheduled lecture, seminar, tutorial or other classroom
activity with a teacher.
Non-Differential Rewards (DR)
Each participant will be paid money to participate in the study
and each will receive the same amount.
Each participant will be paid money to participate in the study.
The exact amount may differ from participant to participant. It
depends in part on the particular decisions a participant makes
and also decisions that other participants make. This is the case
if participants make decisions that impact on other participants.
The way decisions lead to how much money is earned will be
explained in detail before decisions are made.
Table 2
Features of the hypothetical experiment. Each participant was shown (1) the set of fixed features
and (2) either the positive or the negative version for each of the individual features.
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version of a feature was administered to half of the participants and that each participant
received an even mix of negative and positive features on average (mean: 4.5). However
we allowed the number of positive features to differ between participants (min=1, max=8)
in order to assess their joint effect on overall perceptions: Participants who are shown more
positive features (that were designed as countermeasures) should rate the hypothetical
study overall as less harmful.
To measure this overall assessment participants were shown, after the presentation of the
nine feature versions, all previously-shown features together along with the fixed feature
set and asked: “Overall, how strongly do you agree or disagree that researchers should
be allowed to conduct a study with all the features described above? (Remember: if this
question is chosen, you will receive the bonus if your answer is the same as the most popular
answer).” As in Krupka and Weber (2013), responses were recorded along a four-point
rating scale of strongly disagree (coded as 1), somewhat disagree (2), somewhat agree (3)
and strongly agree (4).
In this design each participant recorded ten measures of ethical perception towards the
hypothetical study: one for each of the individual nine feature versions, and one overall,
elicited after all features were individually presented. These constitute our dependent
variables of individual feature harm assessment (denoted IA) and overall agreement (OA)
respectively.
3.2 Participants’ Assessment of Individual Features (IA)
The assessment of the individual positive features (IA) averaged across all participants
and all features was 3.24. For negative features, it was 2.57. This suggests that overall our
countermeasures assuaged participants’ perception of harm. To test the efficacy of each of
the nine individual features of the hypothetical study, we conduct univariate analyses of
differences across participants who saw the positive and negative version of each of the
features. The bars in the top panel of figure 1 show the IA for every feature version as the
average across all participants who saw that version. T-tests show that positive versions,
compared to the corresponding negatives ones, significantly reduced perception of harm for
every individual feature. Cohen’s d-values show that the effect sizes are large for informed
consent, debriefing and non-differential rewards and medium for the remaining six.
We then examine the same issue using regressions to check whether results from our
univariate analyses are robust to individual heterogeneity in terms of age, gender and
whether a participant was born in the U.S.A. or abroad. Equation 1 outlines the estimation
specification for each of the regressions.
IA = β0 + βiPositive+ γiZi + ε (1)
The dependent variable was participants’ perception of harm (IA) and the independent
variables were, for each feature, whether a participant was shown the positive (coded as 1)
or the negative version (coded as 0). The set of additional controls (Zi) include individual
characteristics of age, gender and U.S. birth. 7
7 We report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) rather than Ordered Probit regressions here and in
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Participants’ Assessment of Individual Features IA
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2.7182.6282.6732.541
2.218
2.633
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p=0.0000*** p=0.0000*** p=0.0000*** p=0.0000*** p=0.0000*** p=0.0000*** p=0.0000*** p=0.0000*** p=0.0000***
d=0.578 d=0.967 d=0.908 d=0.646 d=0.539 d=0.625 d=0.671 d=0.542 d=0.915
Participants’ Overall Agreement OA
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2.527
2.6512.5792.6152.6192.5822.6082.5622.537
2.830
2.7072.7872.7452.7402.7762.7522.7962.822
Positive Version Negative Version
p=0.006*** p=0.024** p=0.168 p=0.063* p=0.247 p=0.213 p=0.045** p=0.586 p=0.004***
d=0.323 d=0.265 d=0.161 d=0.218 d=0.136 d=0.146 d=0.235 d=0.064 d=0.344
 1
Fig. 1. Participants’ assessment of hypothetical study by individual features and their versions.
Significance of difference in means and effect size shown as p-values and Cohen’s d. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Results are reported in table 3. Each model (presented in separate columns) estimates
participants’ IA for each of the different individual features. The coefficients for the
positive version dummies (βi) are always positive and significant. Thus we conclude that
all countermeasures have the desired effect in improving the participants’ harm perception.
Result 1 The individual countermeasures for every feature of the hypothetical study
significantly lower participants’ perception of participation risk from that feature.
the following because some of our multivariate analyses involve combining coefficient estimates
from regressions to find differences in treatment effects across gender. Combining coefficient
estimates obtained from probit regressions can lead to biased estimates (Ai and Norton, 2003).
For the sake of consistency, we use OLS regressions throughout. Also we are interested in relative
effect sizes that are visible in standardidsed (beta) coefficients that Probit does not generate.
Our results, in terms of the (in)significance of individual variables, are robust with respect to
either estimation technique.
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DB IC ER OI TE RD PP CT DR
Age -0.002 -0.003 -0.104∗ -0.057 -0.058 -0.082 -0.040 -0.076 -0.091∗
(0.00933) (0.00985) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.00895) (0.00864) (0.0108) (0.00900) (0.00742)
U.S. Birth 0.024 0.022 0.016 0.035 -0.039 -0.005 0.016 0.015 0.037
(0.282) (0.279) (0.250) (0.255) (0.285) (0.186) (0.268) (0.243) (0.245)
Female -0.005 0.004 -0.042 -0.113∗∗ -0.079 -0.077 0.048 -0.073 -0.005
(0.106) (0.118) (0.113) (0.110) (0.117) (0.107) (0.116) (0.106) (0.101)
Positive Version 0.278∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.118) (0.112) (0.110) (0.116) (0.107) (0.117) (0.106) (0.101)
N 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
R2 0.078 0.191 0.186 0.113 0.079 0.103 0.106 0.081 0.184
Table 3
Ordinary Least Squares regression results for participants’ individual assessment of the respective
features of the hypothetical study. Features denoted by their acronyms. Standardised beta
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3.3 Participants’ Overall Agreement (OA)
We also examined whether the countermeasures raised OA, the overall assessment partici-
pants made of harm, based on all the features they were presented with. OA averaged
across all feature versions and participants was 2.68 (2.66 for males, 2.70 for females,
not significantly different). If the countermeasures are successful then participants who
saw more should have better perceptions of the hypothetical study. The scatterplot in
figure 2 shows the relationship between participants’ OA ratings (Y-axis) and the number
of positive features they saw (X-axis). Indeed participants’ OA is significantly and posi-
tively correlated with the number of positive features participants saw (Pearson r =0.302,
p=0.0000).
Result 2 Together, the countermeasures significantly lower participants’ overall perception
of participation risks of the hypothetical study.
The bottom panel in figure 1 shows OA by feature versions, i.e. averaged for those
participants who were shown a particular version. The t-tests show that participants’ OA
was significantly (at the 5% level of significance or better) raised by being shown the positive
rather than the negative version of the following features: debriefing, informed consent,
opt-in (marginally), private payment and non-differential rewards. Positive versions of
educational relevance, non-teacher experimenters, non-class time and recruitment database
did not improve participants’ overall perception of harm.
However, these univariate tests do not control for the number and type of positive features
each participant saw. To account for this, we analysed OA in a multivariate framework.
All study features were simultaneously entered as independent dummy variables for being
shown the positive version coded as 1. The model specifications are presented below.
Equation 2 does not control for individuals characteristics whereas equation 3 does.
OA = β0 + βiXi + ε (2)
OA = β0 + βiXi + γiZi + ε (3)
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3
4
OA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Total Number of Positive Features
Fig. 2. Number of positive features presented to participants by their overall agreement with
the study (OA). Dots around each integer coordinate represent number of obervations for that
coordinate (e.g. three participants with six positive features had an overall assessment of ‘slightly
disagree’). Fitted line shown in bold. The grey shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
Here βi represents the marginal effect of each positive feature on OA controlling for the
other countermeasures the participants may have been exposed to. Results are presented
in Table 4. The first two columns estimate equations 2 and 3 for all participants. Unlike
the case for IA, we find that only some of the countermeasures have a significant impact
on overall perception of harm. Providing debriefs, an informed consent procedure and
non-differential rewards significantly enhance perceptions of the hypothetical study. Opt-in
marginally (i.e. at the 10% level) increases OA. The other features do not affect overall
perceptions of harm. With the exception of the latter results, the significance of the
independent variables is robust to the inclusion of the controls (equation 3). Additionally
the dummy variable for U.S.-born participants is significant, marginally at the 10%-level.
Result 3 Controlling for demographics, some countermeasures (debriefing, informed con-
sent, opt-in and non-differential rewards) significantly enhance participants’ overall agree-
ment with conducting the hypothetical study.
3.4 Gender Effects
In this section we analyse gender differences in participants’ perception of ethical norms
due to our treatments. In previous experimental work, female participants have been found
to be more risk averse (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), less trusting (Buchan et al., 2008) and
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DV: OA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Males Males Females Females
DB 0.154∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.073 0.068 0.234∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.102) (0.146) (0.149) (0.145) (0.143)
IC 0.153∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.143∗ 0.140∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.156∗
(0.101) (0.103) (0.142) (0.143) (0.148) (0.149)
ER 0.081 0.081 0.065 0.062 0.089 0.090
(0.103) (0.103) (0.138) (0.137) (0.162) (0.162)
OI 0.100∗ 0.092 0.077 0.063 0.079 0.082
(0.101) (0.102) (0.143) (0.151) (0.148) (0.146)
TE 0.050 0.043 0.110 0.108 0.023 0.009
(0.104) (0.106) (0.139) (0.143) (0.165) (0.165)
RD 0.066 0.066 -0.028 -0.030 0.204∗∗ 0.208∗∗
(0.104) (0.105) (0.148) (0.150) (0.152) (0.152)
PP 0.093 0.088 -0.006 -0.008 0.210∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.101) (0.141) (0.141) (0.143) (0.141)
CT 0.022 0.021 -0.040 -0.038 0.111 0.103
(0.103) (0.103) (0.143) (0.145) (0.149) (0.148)
DR 0.159∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.052 0.041
(0.102) (0.102) (0.146) (0.149) (0.143) (0.139)
Female 0.010
(0.101)
Age -0.017 -0.019 -0.025
(0.00817) (0.0101) (0.0140)
U.S. Birth 0.088∗ 0.060 0.142∗
(0.194) (0.275) (0.278)
N 293.000 293.000 154.000 154.000 139.000 139.000
R2 0.109 0.117 0.096 0.100 0.208 0.229
Table 4
Ordinary Least Squares regression results for participants’ overall agreement with the hypothetical
study. Standardised beta coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
less willing to compete (Gneezy et al., 2003) than male participants. These preferences can
potentially shape gender-specific attitudes towards participating in research, particularly
experiments (e.g. Cleave et al., 2013): Participation in experiments entails risks, elements of
competition with co-participants and some degree of trust in the researchers. Additionally,
attitudes towards individual features, like the ones relating to learning outcomes, may differ
to the extent that female university students tend to be educationally more motivated (e.g.
McNabb et al., 2002). These individual views may bias the ethical norm perceptions of our
participants in the direction of their (gendered) individual views through social projection
or false consensus effect (Wenzel, 2005). As a result the norm perceptions of males and
females in the experiment may differ.
Models 3 to 6 in table 4 re-estimate equations 2 and 3 for male and female participants
respectively. As previously we first estimate models for the nine positive versions before
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Differences estimates for DB IC ER OI TR RD PP CT DR
IA
(Positive version - Negative version)|Male 0.343*** 0.498*** 0.405*** 0.242*** 0.250*** 0.347*** 0.314*** 0.338*** 0.490***
(Positive version - Negative version)|Female 0.390** 0.814*** 0.901*** 0.754*** 0.556*** 0.444*** 0.669*** 0.342** 0.632***
OA
(Positive version - Negative version)|Male 0.110 0.237* 0.103 0.092 0.184 -0.053 -0.016 -0.064 0.440***
(Positive version - Negative version)|Female 0.433*** 0.290* 0.166 0.149 0.021 0.380** 0.376*** 0.195 0.080
Table 5
Difference estimates for effects of female gender and positive version on IA (top panel) and
OA (bottom panel) for each feature denoted by acronyms. The IA estimates are derived from
individual regessions for each characteristic outlined in equation 4. The OA estimates are derived
from the regression outlined in equation 5. Standardised beta coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
including demographic controls. They show marked differences in the perceptions of men
and women. For males, informed consent is (marginally) significant as are non-differential
rewards. For female participants, debriefing and informed consent remain significant, but
not opt in or non-differential rewards. Two variables that are insignificant for all participants
are significant for women: recruitment database and private payment delivery. Compared
to men, a greater number of positive features affect women’s perceptions of the ethical
appropriateness of the hypothetical study. This is further evidenced by the much greater
R2 value for women that attest to the greater explanatory power of the countermeasures
on women’s perceptions.
To provide more evidence we ran two further regressions for IA and OA respectively
(equations 4 and 5).
IA = β0 + βiPositive+ δ1Female+ θiFemale× Positive+ γiZi + ε (4)
OA = β0 + βiXi + δ1Female+ θiXi × Female+ γiZi + ε (5)
For the IA regression, we are interested in the difference estimates across gender due
to our treatment. βi captures the effect of countermeasure i for male participants. Thus
βi > (<) 0 implies that countermeasure i has a positive (negative) effect on male
participants’ perceptions. The effect of a countermeasure i on IA for females is given by
βi + θi. As before, the set of additional controls (Zi) include individual characteristics
of age and U.S. birth. For the OA regression, βi and βi + θi capture the effect of each
countermeasure i for male and female participants respectively. The difference estimates
from the IA and OA regressions are presented in Table 5. Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix
show the full estimations.
The results for the IA regressions show that all nine countermeasures have a positive
impact on perceptions for both male and female participants. Additionally, the magnitude
of the positive impact is greater for female participants throughout. Turning to the OA
estimates, we find only informed consent had a positive impact on the perceptions of
both male and female participants. Our countermeasures of educational relevance, opt-in,
non-teacher researcher and non-class time had no effect on perceptions of either gender.
Finally, non-differential rewards were important only for male participants; debriefing,
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recruitment database and private payment delivery were important for female participants.
Result 4 Individual countermeasures have a greater positive impact on females’ overall
assessment of the appropriateness of the hypothetical study. Females’ overall perception is
influenced by different features than males. Experimental countermeasures are therefore
gender-specific to an extent.
4 Discussion
What are the implications of our findings for designing economic experiments? As we have
argued, tradeoffs exist between ethical risks and the scientific integrity of research. This
means that the design of ethics-conscious research features needs to be informed by the
opportunity costs in terms of both economic and scientific costs. Table 6 contains an
overview of costs and benefits of the different features. In the table we summarise the
results for each of the countermeasures (ordered by importance) in terms of univariate
effect size and marginal effects from regressions for IA and OA. The table also summarises
economic and scientific downsides to each countermeasure. We now discuss each of these
countermeasures in this light.
Informed Consent The most important feature we identified is informed consent,
i.e. that participants decide to volunteer based on relevant information given to them
beforehand. In our regression it is significant overall, for females and marginally for males,
and is associated with the second-highest and highest effect size in the univariate analysis
of OA and IA respectively. For experimental economists, the downside of this feature is
that the information provided could cause demand effects or allow participants to gain
task-related experience that makes them unrepresentative. This is an issue especially where
participation is motivated by financial gain providing an incentive for such preparation.
Knowledge of the exact tasks may allow certain kinds of participants to self select into the
study, causing bias. In practice it is possible to devise general informed consent documents
that give participants enough information without biasing them.
Debriefing There are good reasons for experimental economists to conduct debriefings,
overall the second most effective feature of our study. Debriefing is a highly significant
countermeasure in all our analyses and has the largest effect size for overall agreement.
What are the downsides? Writing and disseminating suitable materials can be done at
modest cost and inconvenience to researchers, especially if electronic media are used.
More significant is the danger that debriefs are leaked to future participants and can
bias them in two ways (Friedman and Sunder, 1994, p. 13, 30): One is what might be
called encumbered participants, i.e. that they gain experience of the tasks that makes
then unrepresentative and/or generates demand effects (de Quidt et al., 2019, p. 389).
The other is that this knowledge causes demand effects, i.e. responses in line with what
participants think experimenters want. Experimental economists would need to be mindful
of releasing debriefs only after data collection has been completed.
Non-Differential Rewards We found evidence that incentive compatibility or performance-
related rewards contribute to a lower overall perceived appropriateness of research. We
saw this result was driven by the responses of male participants. Our data do not reveal
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Counter-
measures
Effect Downsides
IA OA Economic Costs Scientific Issues
d d Significance β
Informed
Consent
1.384 0.497 Overall,
males
(marginally),
females
0.153 Creation of consent mate-
rials; reading takes partic-
ipants time
Demand effects, encum-
bered participants, selec-
tion bias
Debriefing 0.894 0.533 Overall, fe-
males
0.154 Creation and dissemina-
tion of materials
Demand effects, encum-
bered participants
Non-
Differential
Rewards
0.858 0.137 Overall,
males
0.159 Determining and deliver-
ing performance-related
pay is logistically more
challenging
Salience of rewards
Opt-In 0.996 0.338 Overall
(marginally)
0.100 Increased participant re-
cruitment effort
Selection bias
Private Pay-
ment
1.246 0.223 Females 0.093 Greater logistical de-
mands (e.g. assistants
and infrastructure)
Response bias from desir-
ability
Recruitment
Database
0.480 0.196 Females 0.066 Database recruitment is
administratively more
costly in the short run
due to scale economies
Demand effects, encum-
bered participants
Educational
Relevance
1.172 0.447 Not signifi-
cant
0.081 Targeted recruitment in-
creases effort and reduces
potential participant pool
Demand effects, encum-
bered participants
Non-
Teacher
Researcher
0.870 0.283 Not signifi-
cant
0.050 Recruitment and training
of assistants
Data quality
Non-Class
Time
0.870 0.131 Not signifi-
cant
0.022 Increased participant re-
cruitment effort
Selection bias, demand ef-
fects, encumbered partic-
ipants
Table 6
Costs and benefits of countermeasures in terms of effects on participants ethics concerns,
economic costs and implications for scientific integrity. Effect sizes given as Cohen’s d and
Ordinary Least Squares beta coefficients (β).
the underlying reasons, which might include greater self-image or equality concerns in
males. However, incentive compatibility is an essential feature of experimental economics.
An awareness that differential rewards can be an issue may inform design choices experi-
mentalists make at low cost. Again, related countermeasures such as the private delivery
of payments, informed consent and debriefing documentation that explains incentive
compatibility can help.
Opt-In Opt-in is a significant influence on OA in our univariate analyses. In the regres-
sions opt-in was marginally significant overall. Implementing opt-in has two downsides,
both of which seem modest when put into perspective: Participants who actively seek
participation may be unrepresentative, but the available evidence does not support this
(e.g. Cleave et al., 2013). Note that conversely, under opt-out, unwilling participants who
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did not take the exit option may bias responses in a different way. The other is recruitment
cost: Ceteris paribus, opt-out should generate more participants.
Private Payment Our private payment feature related to the possibility of participants
seeing each other’s rewards (rather than experimenter blindness to earnings). As all other
features, the effect on private payment of the individual feature assessment IA was
significant. However, private earnings delivery was significant in our analyses of overall
agreement only for females. Experimental economists often choose to conduct payment
privately for this and other reasons. It is not costly (unless a separate room is used) and
has clear scientific benefits, such as avoiding response biases when participants fear their
actions are revealed or envy caused from the money they receive.
Recruitment Database A case for using recruitment databases for ethical reasons again
comes only from the perceptions of our female participants. In addition, all participants
preferred the opportunity of signing up to a recruitment database to receiving unsolicited
e-mail invitations in the significant effects on IA. Again there are also good scientific
reasons why researchers may want to establish a recruitment database irrespective of ethics
considerations (see Greiner, 2015, for more detail).
Educational Relevance While educational relevance was insignificant overall, it had
relatively high univariate effect sizes on IA and OA. There are several steps economists
can take to enhance educational relevance at relative ease, such as designing recruitment,
informed consent and debrief materials with educational relevance in mind. In all these
cases the timing of research (especially experiment) matters in order to avoid participants
learning enough about the research and purposes so as to be unrepresentative or create
demand effects.
Non-Teacher Researcher We found no evidence that dependent relationships between
teacher-researcher and participant significantly influences overall perceptions of study
appropriateness. However in practice ERBs may require researchers to address them. In
theory this problem is simple to solve by recruiting research assistants to liaise with
students. Further, advertising the names of researchers would allow students to avoid
research conducted by their own teachers. Moreover, recruitment efforts could take place
outside the context of a class or course and studies take place outside class time (see the
relevant paragraph below). The problem for economists is mainly cost such as the expense
of identifying and training suitable assistants. Some teacher-researchers may worry about
the quality of data collected and the lack of quality control if they were banned from labs.
Non-Class Time Conducting research during class time can lower the cost of recruitment
(Friedman and Sunder, 1994, p. 43) but involves a risk of responses biased by participants’
knowledge or motivation to please the experimenter. We did not find this feature to be a
significant effect on OA over all participants either in univariate or multivariate analysis.
When economics experiments are conducted during class time, again the countermeasures
for other features can alleviate some of the associated issues such as opt-in, educational
relevance and dependent relationships. Student participants may find class time experiments
more acceptable to the extent that participation is not assumed (and alternative activities
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are offered, as discussed previously) and there is a clear relevance to the syllabus.
Gender Effects While there is no gender difference in overall appropriateness perceptions
of research, we found that male and female participants respond to different countermea-
sures. Females’ perceptions are influenced by a greater number of features, suggesting they
are more sensitive to different aspects of study participation. These differentials matter
in terms of sample selection, especially when research are conducted that explore gender
differences or target one specific gender.
5 Concluding Remarks
We presented a first dedicated examination, both theoretical and empirical, of ethical issues
involved in student participation in empirical research studies. We assessed five areas of
potential ethical risk identified in policy guidelines. The present study shows these can be
effectively addressed by some of the design countermeasures that were identified. 8
Two points are worth re-emphasising before we discuss implications. The first is that our
paper is not an assessment of the ethics of actual experimental economics practice. Instead
we set out to examine the potential ethical issues that could arise when experiments are
conducted with students. As a result, the ethical issues we discuss do not come from
our own assessment of experimental practice but rather what is contained in typical
ERB policy. Whether these issues are recognised by participants is an empirical question
that we examine in our study. 9 The results provide evidence-based responses to ethical
queries from ERBs that economists increasingly face. We believe this kind of systematic
and objective approach is an effective and credible way to engage these issues. We see
providing economists with information about ERB concerns and counterarguments as
a key motivation of this paper, similar to Greiner and Stephanides (2019). Having said
that it is also important to acknowledge that experimental economists do already have a
number of norms, some of which relate ethical issues. 10 However the manner has been
largely informal and decentralised. As a result, these ethical concerns and the efficacy of
some of the best practices adopted have not been well articulated in the behavioural and
experimental economics literature.
We believe our work is important and timely because the ethics of student experiments
is likely to grow rather than diminish in importance in the future. Recruiting students
will continue to be an important component of economic method despite the increasing
recruitment of non-students (Henrich et al., 2010). Moreover, the increasing interest in field
experiments, randomised controlled trials, neuroeconomics, emotions, and the dark side of
human motivation will raise the potential for ethical issues in future economic experiments
8 It should be noted that our participants are opt-in student volunteers in an online labour
market where paid study participation is common. As a result they may be biased towards positive
views of experiments.
9 Greiner and Stephanides (2019, p. 317) discuss some results of such an excercise conducted
via the mailing list of the Economic Science Association.
10 de Quidt et al. (2019) survey some of these norms (regarding experimental design, setting
and reporting standards). While many of these have merely scientific motivations, others (like
non-deception) also have clear ethical relevance.
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more generally (Barrett and Carter, 2010; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2015). Institutional
scrutiny of human (and especially student) participants in research is likely to rise in step.
What is the way forward? We believe more debate is needed. In our experience many
experimental economists have not engaged with the ethics debate and maintain ambivalent
attitudes towards ERB processes. Many believe that, compared to psychology, our own
topics and methods harbour fewer ethical issues in general and from student participation
in particular (e.g. Blomfield, 2012; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2015). Compared to psychology,
there has been little debate of the ethical issues of experimental economics within the
discipline (Barrett and Carter, 2010; Blomfield, 2012; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2015). The
standard “how-to” references date from the 1990s (Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Davis and
Holt, 1993) and contain virtually no references to ethical issues. 11 This is also true for
the key methodological contributions (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; Croson, 2005; Guala,
2005; Ariely and Norton, 2007; Bardsley et al., 2009; Croson and Ga¨chter, 2010; Henrich
et al., 2010). Potential issues such as deception are debated mainly in terms of its scientific
rather than ethical implications (e.g. Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002). One important actual
controversy, the Brisbane bus driver experiment (see Ortmann, 2015), was discussed in
the media but not in professional outlets of experimental economics.
We believe that more debate is in the self interest of experimental economics. Ethics
review, when carried out well, can be valuable to research. One reason is behavioural:
Researchers can be too close to their own research or lack information and experience to
assess ethical risks appropriately. In addition, it is not clear to what extent the researcher
conducting an experiment is an appropriate judge of whether its scientific importance
can offset associated ethical risks to the extent that she may be subject to selection and
self serving biases. While researchers should be routinely concerned about the welfare of
participants this is especially true when a professional care relationship exists, as is the
case with students.
A debate over ethics should result in the creation of a professional code of conduct for
experimental economics as exists for psychology. While the lack of a code is understandable
due to the later development of experimental economics, its recent high profile and success
demand more attention be paid by its practitioners in this area. Greater outside scrutiny will
no doubt be the result. Such a code would protect not only participants but also researchers
should adverse effects arise. Such a common standard would also help the profession better
inform ERBs and facilitate gaining ethics clearance for economic experiments in timely
fashion.
Conversely our work demonstrates that ERBs should design their own processes based
on better information and evidence. The dangers of overzealous ethics review processes
are clear to the extent that we found little support for some of their concerns. ERBs are
often unaware of the difference in practice between disciplines (such as economics and
psychology) and need to be suitably appraised. This echoes views of ERB overreach or
misplaced concerns. For example, commentators like Haggerty (2004, p. 392) and Van den
11 Since the first submitted version of this paper such discussion has appeared in print (Greiner
and Stephanides, 2019).
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Hoonaard (2011), speak of an institutional ‘ethics creep’ to encompass practices and
enforce conventions beyond the original aim of regulators that “now poses dangers to
the ability to conduct university based research.” Other authors like Baron (2015) as well
as Page and Page (2017) suggest systematically biased and erroneous decision making
by ethics review boards (ERBs) that unnecessarily hinders scientific progress and impose
unjustifiable costs. To safeguard scientific progress, ethics policies should be based on better
evidence. It is also worth noting that addressing ethics concerns impact on researchers
unequally in that the associated financial burdens are harder for less well resourced projects
and researchers to bear.
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Appendix
DV: IA for DB IC ER OI TE RD PP CT DR
Age -0.004 -0.010 -0.105* -0.057 -0.057 -0.082 -0.041 -0.074 -0.095**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
U.S. Birth 0.020 0.021 0.016 0.042 -0.039 -0.007 0.016 0.019 0.046
(0.283) (0.280) (0.249) (0.252) (0.286) (0.185) (0.268) (0.238) (0.243)
Female 0.063 0.071 -0.052 -0.182** -0.090 -0.021 0.045 0.005 0.074
(0.154) (0.184) (0.178) (0.166) (0.176) (0.165) (0.163) (0.158) (0.153)
Positive Version 0.343*** 0.498*** 0.405*** 0.242*** 0.249*** 0.347*** 0.314*** 0.338*** 0.490***
(0.136) (0.163) (0.149) (0.146) (0.155) (0.135) (0.164) (0.136) (0.132)
Positive Version × Female -0.116 -0.116 0.017 0.119 0.018 -0.096 0.005 -0.131 -0.134
(0.212) (0.240) (0.226) (0.219) (0.235) (0.214) (0.232) (0.212) (0.204)
Constant 2.519*** 2.099*** 2.934*** 2.891*** 3.088*** 3.056*** 2.418*** 2.813*** 2.764***
(0.371) (0.350) (0.362) (0.371) (0.347) (0.292) (0.402) (0.304) (0.304)
N 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
R2 0.083 0.195 0.186 0.118 0.080 0.106 0.106 0.087 0.190
Table 7
Ordinary Least Squares regression results for participants’ individual assessment of the respective
features of the hypothetical study. Features denoted by their acronyms. Standardised beta
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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DV: OA
Age 0.027 (0.009)
U.S. Birth 0.124 * (0.255)
Female -0.091 (0.324)
Age -0.026 (0.009)
U.S. Birth 0.102* (0.193)
Female -0.278 (0.314)
Positive Version for:
DB 0.062 (0.149)
IC 0.133* (0.143)
ER 0.058 (0.138)
OI 0.051 (0.147)
TE 0.103 (0.142)
RD -0.030 (0.150)
PP -0.009 (0.142)
CT -0.036 (0.145)
DR 0.247*** (0.148)
Positive Version × Female for:
DB 0.155 (0.207)
IC 0.026 (0.206)
ER 0.030 (0.212)
OI 0.028 (0.207)
TE -0.076 (0.218)
RD 0.206** (0.212)
PP 0.185* (0.200)
CT 0.122 (0.207)
DR -0.173 (0.203)
Constant 1.883*** (0.329)
N 293
R2 0.164
Table 8
Ordinary Least Squares regression results for participants’ overall agreement with the hypothetical
study. Standardised beta coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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